By Rasika Baig | 29 July 2024
2. The legal definition of online child pornography
The notion of conceptualising online
child pornography into a clearcut legal definition fails to recognise that it
is almost impossible to capture all the material that an adult with a sexual
interest in children may consider sexualised or sexual.[10]
Section 1 of the Protection of Children
Act 1978 (‘POCA 1978’) provides:
‘(1) it is an offence for a person –
(a) To take, or permit to
be taken, or to make any indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child;
or
(b) To distribute or show
such indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs; or
(c) To have in his possession such indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs, with a view to their being distributed or shown by himself or others’[11]
It is complimented with Section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (‘CJA 1988’) which confers a similar statutory provision that: ‘(1) it is an offence for a person to have any indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child … in his possession’[12]
In the United Kingdom, POCA 1978 and CJA 1988 are the primary laws criminalising online child pornography. [13] However, in its provisions, it strictly highlights that in order to first satisfy a photograph as a piece of online child pornography, it needs to be considered ‘indecent’.[14] On the question of whether an image is indecent, the courts in R v. O’Carroll [2003] confirmed that it is ultimately for the jury to decide and that ‘[a] dictum of a judge in one case in this court as to what constitutes a “pornographic image” cannot bind a jury as to what in another case is indecent material’.[15] Krone critiqued the effectiveness of having a subjective standard over a photograph, as arguably almost any image of a child can become sexually charged. [16] Gillespie affirms that “while it may be relatively easy to identify clearly indecent images (e.g., photographs of prepubescent children engaged in a sexual act), it becomes more difficult to define images that are less explicit” (e.g., photographs of an older adolescent who is partially clothed).[17] This reflects the pre-existing scholarship surrounding the regulation of online child pornography, namely, that one single legal definition of child pornography cannot capture all the material that an adult with a sexual interest in children may consider sexualised, or sexual.[18] As pointed out by Long et al, child pornography can also include what they refer to as ‘everyday’ or ‘accidental’ naked images of children.[19] Therefore, this sets a loophole in the law, as general photographs of children may not be considered ‘indecent’ in the view of a jury that has been directed to look for conventionally derogative photographs of children in an indecent manner. [20] Affirmed by R v. Neal [2011], “whilst members of a jury are representative of the public, it remains essential for them to consider the issue of indecency by reference to an objective test, rather than applying their wholly subjective views of the matter”.[21] Therefore, the existing laws will only work better and in an uncompromising manner if the subjective approach is taken away and the enactment are reframed to match the actual harm around online child pornography.[22]
Accordingly, the nature of the material is a contested topic when it comes to clearly defining what is considered as online child pornography under the law. [23] Gillespie confirms that offenders use a broad range of material, and yet much of this will not be included within legal definitions of child pornography.[24] This can be due to the fact that a subjective standard as set out in POCA 1978 and CJA 1988 focuses almost exclusively upon the product (the photograph) and not the purpose of the taking, possession or distribution.[25] It has been noted that this is, in part, because POCA 1978 and CJA 1988 have been derived from obscenity laws and so the use or purpose of the material is less important than what it depicts.[26] Synonymous to how the law deals with ‘indecent’ photographs today, the concept of obscenity laws was to simply observe whether the photograph could be acceptable to ordinary society.[27] As can be assumed, this would be influenced by society’s perceptions and stereotypes over what is conventionally considered obscene [28] Shackel commented that to balance between an ‘objective standard [where] certain materials are [strictly considered] pornographic or not’[29] and a subjective standard applied in the courts today, a solution would be to adopt a two-limb hybrid model that was used in R v. Court [1989] for the meaning of ‘sexual’.[30] Such a legal test would establish two criterions: (a) it would create an objective test whereby a photograph will be considered indecent irrespective of the offender’s motivations and (b) a subjective test where the photograph is not obviously indecent but where it is capable of being indecent.[31] As affirmed by Agal, this will ensure that jurors are making an active assessment of whether the photograph is ‘indecent’ in light of the context and the objective standard set by the courts.[32]
3. The treatment of pseudo-photographs
In another light, the treatment of what is considered ‘pseudo-photograph’ in the context of online child pornography has further exacerbated the problem of effective regulation. Section 7(7) of POCA 1978 defines ‘pseudo-photograph’ as “an image, whether made by computer graphics, or otherwise howsoever, which appears to be a photograph”. [33] These technologies allow individuals to produce “visual depictions of children engaging in sexually explicit conduct which are virtually indistinguishable to an unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographs of actual minors engaging in such conduct”. [34] To help in its interpretation, Section 7(8) of POCA 1978 holds that “if the impression conveyed by a pseudo-photograph is that the person shown is a child [or where the predominant impression conveyed is that the person shown is a child notwithstanding some of the physical characteristics shown are those of an adult] then, the pseudo-photograph shall be treated for all purposes of this Act as showing a child’.[35] This brings to the overall hardship conveyed by legislators over who is considered a child under the law. [36] While Section 45 of the Sexual Offences Act connotes that someone under the age of eighteen is a child for the purposes of the offences under POCA 1978,[37] the courts recognise that whether someone appears to be a ‘child’ in a photograph, or a video is a question of fact.[38] This standard came from the Court of Appeal case in R v. Land [1997], where it was held that the jury can be placed as an expert to determine whether a person is depicted under the legal age. [39] However, Clough acknowledged that this places “too much faith in the tier of fact” to determine, in borderline cases, whether a person appears to be under eighteen. [40] This can be even harder when considering whether the child in the photograph is in fact real.[41] Solowey noted that the current law is founded on the notion that actual children are exploited during the production of child pornography and therefore does not consider pseudo-photographs involving drawings, computer-generated images of children and cartoons. [42] As recently stated by the International Association of Prosecutors, “[with computer technology improving] it will become increasingly difficult for any expert to distinguish between ‘real’ and ‘morphed’ child pornography. Thus, any defendant will be more likely to defeat a prosecution by simply claiming that his images were not real victims”.[43]
To combat this loophole established by the law, Ost acknowledged that where it can be shown that a pseudo-photograph seemed to bring real harm to a real child, an legal interference can be easily justified. [44] Courts have recognised that harm exists to actual children whose faces have been cut and pasted to pictures of adult bodies in sexually explicit positions. [45] As was demonstrated in Goodland v. DPP [2000], where a pornographic image of an adult female was spliced together with the head of a young child, creating the appearance together that the photograph was of a naked child. [46] While Clough recognised that even though there was no actual harm to a real child in the case, it could legitimately be said that there has been exploitation of a child. [47] However, the Divisional Court quashed the defendant’s conviction for possessing an indecent photograph of a child, stating that it did not have the appearance of a photograph pursuant to Section 7(7) of POCA 1978.[48] Affirmed by Gillespie, computer generated photographs (although legislated) lack the sufficient clarity to be considered a photograph and are instead a drawing or other visual depiction that would not be criminalised under the law. [49]
However, Solowey acknowledged that even if the final image may result in a fictious child, an actual child’s image, which was once identifiable, has been used. [50] Accordingly in this context, the courts could accept part, if not all, of computer-generated child pornography’s ability to be regulated. [51] The problem with not regulating these types of pseudo-photographs is that it is likely to encourage the abuse of real children by ‘normalising’ pornographic depictions of children and nevertheless victimise the child whose face is superimposed on a sexually explicit photo of an adult.[52] Because of these additional harms, Esposito affirms that all child pornography, regardless of whether real children were involved in the production should be illegal.[53]
4. Possession of online child pornography
While there are legal challenges satisfying criterions of what is considered as online child pornography, the merits of the UK law come from the fact that they “go beyond prohibiting only production and distribution to also the possession of online child pornography”.[54] As stipulated in Section 1(1)(c) of POCA 1978, possession of a photograph (in the context of online child pornography) will be illegal where it can be proven that it was possessed with a view to it being distributed or shown by himself or others.[55] The words “with a view to” requires that the distributing or showing must be at least one of the suspect’s purpose, but not necessarily his primary purpose.[56] Clough clarified that there needed to be a clear intention, as epitomised in R v. Fellows and Arnold [1997] where the courts found that a person who stores indecent photographs on his computer and enables others to view them via the internet does possess them “with a view to” them being shown. [57] However, Akdeniz recognised that there was a gap in the law whereby an absence of intention could provide an escape from prosecution.[58] In recognising the limitation, the courts in Atkins v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] [59] and R v. Porter [2006] [60] decided to resolve the gap in POCA 1978 by adding a strict two-limb ‘possession’ test. [61] Although the test was only applicable to prosecution of possession under Section 160 of CJA 1988, it resolved the limitation that existed in POCA 1978. [62]Accordingly, it recognised that so long as there was a physical custody or control over the pornographic material, and that the suspect had known that they possessed the material, it was irrelevant whether they intended to possess it for the reason to distribute.[63] This eliminated the additional provision highlighted in Section 1(1)(c) of POCA 1978 and recognised that while it is important to criminalise against possessors who have an intention to distribute, it is even more so to criminalise against those that may simply have child pornography for personal possession.[64] This comes from the rationale that even though a possessor is not the cause of primary harm, “one of the most common policy justifications advanced for the criminalisation of possession is that it leads to people sexually abusing children”. [65] Therefore, the possessors of child pornographic material must be punished for the reason that they are aware that it is illegal and as such, their action of possession must be considered illegal for contributing to the chain of illegality and harm.[66]
Even though the law has opened up to overall criminalisation of simple possession, legislators have recognised that there are still some hindrances in proving the physical custody or control of pornography.[67] While it may be easier for child pornography that is physical (e.g., magazines and actual photographs), it proves to be difficult in an online context. [68] Horsman referenced Atkins v. Director of Public Prosecution [2000] as an example noting that for an offence of possession, it required the hypothetical computer user to have deemed in possession child pornography within its operating system and in their unallocated areas of their digital storage medium.[69] Furthermore, the challenge would be exacerbated in situations where a defendant has successfully removed the material from normal accessible areas of their system and demonstrated that no physical evidence of possession of online child pornography. [70] Where the material can no longer be recoverable in the online system, then legal actions are not prosecutable under Section 160 of CJA 1988. [71] Accordingly, Section 160 of CJA 1988 is being rarely used in the prosecutorial context as it is better reserved to cases where the evidence is unambiguous in showing genuine possession, for example, where a suspect has the images in printed form or has saved them into a clearly labelled file within the hard drive of the device.[72] Furthermore, R v. Porter [2006] supported this assertion by holding that while deleting an image can divest oneself of possession over them, an exception can be made where a person is shown to have intended to remain in control of the image even though he had deleted it.[73] In this context, it will be stipulated that the suspect had the capacity through skill or software to retrieve the image and be of custody and control over the material.[74] Subject to there being evidence of the act which constituted the making and the necessary mental element, an offence contrary to Section 1 of the POCA 1978 is preferable and in most cases would suffice.[75]
5. International Efforts
While we have determined the effectiveness and the flaws that the laws have provided for the courts, one of its biggest faults comes from the fact that it does little to deal with the international aspect of online child pornography. [76] Because the internet allows the virtually unregulated transmission of such materials across national borders, “the source and destination of child pornography are no longer necessarily within the same country”. [77] What this highlights are a need to regulate child pornography in a more ‘international’ context whereby a universal legal standard can be set to regulate offenders downloading and distributing child pornography over different countries. [78] Esposito recognises that such standards must be clear enough to provide a minimum basis for governments, yet offer the flexibility required for international norms to be successful.[79] As of currently, the only way that the United Kingdom tries to deal with criminals that have used the cyberspace to their advantage is by prosecuting through their extra-territoriality jurisdiction.[80] Section 72 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 confers extra-territorial jurisdiction on the courts in respect of offences within the POCA 1978 and CJA 1988. [81] Accordingly, where images originating on foreign websites are downloaded for viewing in the United Kingdom, the act of making is within their jurisdiction.[82] Furthermore, inciting someone outside of the jurisdiction to distribute indecent images of children within the jurisdiction of the courts in the United Kingdom is triable because the incitement takes place inside the country.[83] However, serious questions arise where the legal standard of the United Kingdom does not match the country where the criminal currently presides.[84] Shackel raised the question as follows: whether child pornography is transmitted by computer and the sending jurisdiction has a lower legal standard than the receiving jurisdiction, which should prevail? [85] The ultimate goal should be a legal framework that ensures child pornographers can be prosecuted irrespective of whether they have committed a crime at a national or international level.[86]
To create international cooperation between nation states such as United Kingdom, Esposito recognised the importance of a binding treaty such as the U.N Convention of the Right of Child.[87] Ma Xinmin (2016) proposes the UN-centric approach as the core governance model in the global cyberspace, because “cyberspace is a sui generis domain, with dual characteristics of reality and virtuality and also dual attributes of sovereignty and global commons”. [88] With the participation of the international community, the Convention would establish a universal definition of children’s rights as part of the international law. [89] Esposito conceded that while the Convention would lay solid ground work for a united, international movement, a successful effort to regulate child pornography must also do the following things: 1) establish universal standards which could be adopted into law by every country, 2) mandate enforcement of those standards on a national level, and 3) create a mechanism for global monitoring for national enforcement and a means of global enforcement.[90] Such approaches imply mutual cooperation, which can be based on political, economic interests, cultural ties and geographic location. [91] However, Shackel recognised that one of the problems in achieving such an outcome is that the sovereignty of the nation states may be viewed as compromised. [92] Given that the current legal framework in most countries is that a state can only have power to exercise jurisdiction where a part of a crime takes place within its territory, or where at least the final part of a crime occurs in that territory, [93] it would be difficult to see how nation states may want to set aside their sovereign power for a universally national convention that would force nation states to compromise and cooperate with one another. [94] In the long run, it would be great to have a common understanding of the fundamentals that are important in the digital age. [95] However, it is incredibly difficult to come to new working mechanisms at the UN level in the conditions of super-rapid development of technologies, on the one hand, and opposing interests of many influential actors, on the other. [96] Logistically, Esposito recognises that enforcement would be best handled first on a national level, but where a crime has crossed beyond a country’s jurisdiction, there needs to be an international structure in place that overcomes loopholes where an inconsistent and divergent approach to the regulation of child pornography in country A might allow a criminal to reside in its jurisdiction to avoid prosecution against the children that have been victimised in country B.[97] As the difficulties of managing the online space have become systemic and since we know that tensions will most likely grow, it is noted that such tools should continue to be used: “multilateral efforts, bilateral agreements, and informal interactions between public and private actors across borders”. [98]
6. Conclusion
Online child pornography in the
United Kingdom has been a subject of debate over the past couple of years with
the advent of technology. [99]
It is clear from the assessment of POCA 1978 and CJA 1988 that
there are still some gaps in the law that have provided offenders with a
loophole surrounding the strict regulation against online child pornography.
What the scholarship so far suggests is that this is an ongoing limitation that
would need to consider the role of the international community, especially
considering the transnational nature of online child pornography and the
national sovereignty which supposes that no state should interfere with the
competence of another unless it is justified because of national jurisdiction.[100]
Furthermore, judicial treatment of how POCA 1978 and CJA 1988
needs to collectively consider that effective regulation of child pornography
will only occur if legislatures expand the legal definition of child
pornography within its Acts.[101]
While currently it uses the indecency standard to assess whether a photograph
is considered pornographic or not, it needs to take into consideration the role
of technology in expanding child pornography to pseudo-photographs that include
visual depictions of children engaged in explicit sexual activity, real or
simulated.[102]
The laws surrounding pseudo-photographs is quite underdeveloped compared to the
general indecency laws surrounding photographs of online child pornography. [103]
Therefore, a law reform surrounding how photographs and pseudo-photographs are
generally dealt in the court system need to be considered in order to
effectively deal with online child pornography in the United Kingdom. [104]
Rasika Baig is a law student from the University of Queensland with experience across pro bono work, legal research, and community legal centres. She is passionate about law reform and environmental law, with a strong interest in access to justice.
[1]Catherine D. Marcum et al, ‘Policing possession of child pornography online: investigating the training and resources dedicated to the investigation of cyber crime’ (2010) 12(4) International Journal of Police Science and Management 519, DOI: 10.1350/ijps.2010.12.4.201.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Lesli C.Esposito
(above n 6) 541.
[4] European
Parliamentary Research Service, Combating
child sexual abuse online (December 2022) 2.
[5] Samuel Petrequin,
‘EU commission proposes plan to fight child pornography’ KX Net (online)
(online at 11 May 2022) <https://www.kxnet.com/news/eu-commission-proposes-plan-to-fight-child-pornography/>.
[6] Jaymi McCann,
‘Cases of perverts accessing child pornography nearly double in five years’
Express (online) (online at 21 February 2021) <https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1400694/child-online-abuse-pornography-cases-doubling>.
[7] Rebecca Camber,
‘Paedophile threat has almost tripled in a year as child pornography use soars
during lockdown’ Daily Mail (online) (online at 26 May 2021) <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9619045/Paedophile-threat-tripled-year-child-pornography-use-soars-lockdown.html>.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Lesli C.Esposito
(above n 9) 542.
[10] Rita Shackel
(above n 5) 143.
[11] Protection of Children Act 1978 (UK), s
1
[12] Criminal Justice Act 1988 (UK), s 160
[13] Alisdair Gillespie, ‘Substantive and Procedural
Legislation in England and Wales to Combat Webcam-Related Child Sexual Abuse’
(2019) in Simone van der Hof et al, Sweetie 2.0: Using Artificial
Intelligence to Fight Webcam Child Sex Tourism, (Springer, 2019).
[14] Suzanne Ost,
‘Criminalising fabricated images of child pornography: A matter of harm or
morality’ (2010) 30(2) The Journal of the
Society of Legal Scholars 6, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121X.2010.00161.x
[15] R v. O’Carroll [2003] EWCA Crim 2338 at
[17] cited in Johnathan Clough, ‘Child pornography’ in Johnathan Clough,
Principles of Cybercrime (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2015).
[16] Tony Krone, Does
Thinking Make It So? Defining Online Child Pornography Possession Offences
(Report No. 299, April 2005) 5.
[17] Alisdair A. Gillespie, ‘Child
pornography: Balancing substantive and evidential law to safeguard children
effectively from abuse’ (2005) The
International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 9, 29-29, DOI:
10.1350/ijep.9.1.29.64790, cited in Juliane A. Kloess et al, ‘The Challenges of
Identifying and Classifying Child Sexual Abuse Material’ (2019) 31(2) Sexual Abuse, 176, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063217724768
[18] Tony Krone, A
Typology of Online Child Pornography Offending (Report No. 279, July 2004) 1.
[19] Matthew L. Long,
Laurence Alison and Michelle McManus, ‘Child pornography offenders and
practical research: an evidenced-based approach to prioritising the
investigation’ (Special Conference Paper, European Police Science and Research
Bulletin, 2010) 189.
[20] Ibid.
[21] R v. Neal [2011] EWCA Crim 461 cited in
Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Indecent and Prohibited Images of Children’ (Web
Page, 20 December 2018) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/indecent-and-prohibited-images-children>.
[22] Parnita Agal,
‘Child Pornography: A comparative analysis’ (2018) 8(4) International Journal of Science and Research 748.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Alisdair
Gillespie, ‘Legal definitions of child pornography’ (2010) 16(1) Journal of Sexual Aggression 27, DOI:
10.1080/13552600903262097.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid, 30.
[27] Ibid, 27.
[28] Ibid, 28.
[29] Rita Shackel
(above n 16) 164.
[30] R v. Court [1989]
AC 28 cited in Alisdair A. Gillespie, ‘Child Pornography’ (2018) 1(1) Lancaster University 8.
[31] Ibid, 9.
[32] Parnita Agal
(above n 27).
[33] Protection of Children Act (above 17), s
7(7)
[34] Karen L. Kinnear,
Childhood Sexual Abuse: A Reference
Handbook (ABC-CLIO, 2nd ed, 2007) 109.
[35] Protection of Children Act (above 37), s
7(8).
[36] Rita Shackel
(above n 33).
[37] Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK), s 45.
[38] Johnathan Clough,
‘Lawful Acts, Unlawful Images: The Problematic Definition of ‘Child’
Pornography’ (2012) 38(3) Monash
University Law Review 231.
[39] R v. Land
[1997] EWCA Crim 2409 cited in Johnathan Clough (above n 20) 300.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Rikki Solowey, ‘A
Question of Equivalence: Expanding the Definition of Child Pornography to
Encompass ‘Virtual’ Computer-Generated Images’ (2002) 4(1) Tulane Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property 163.
[43] Rita Shackel
(above n 40) 159.
[44] Suzanne Ost
(above n 19).
[45] Rikki Solowey
(above n 46) 167.
[46] Goodland v. DPP [2000] 2 All ER 425
cited in Johnathan Clough (above n 20) 357.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Alisdair A.
Gillespie (above n 34) 13.
[50] Rikki Solowey
(above n 49).
[51] Ibid.
[52] Rita Shackel
(above n 47).
[53] Lesli C.Esposito
(above n 15) 545.
[54] Nnenna
Ifeanyi-Ajufo (above n 4) 72.
[55] Protection of Children Act (above 39), s
1(1)(c)
[56] Crown Prosecution
Service (above n 26).
[57] Johnathan Clough
(above n 43) 331-332.
[58] Yaman Akdeniz,
‘Governing Pornography & Child Pornography on the Internet: The UK
Approach’ (2001) 32(1) University of West
Los Angeles Law Review.
[59] Atkins v.
Director of Public Prosecution [2000] 2 Cr App R 248
[60] R v. Porter (Ross Warwick) [2006] EWCA
Crim 560.
[61] Graeme Horsman,
‘Digital forensics: Understanding the development of criminal law in England
and Wales on images depicting child sexual abuse’ (2016) 32(3) Computer Law
& Security Review 19 DOI: 10.1016/j.clsr.2016.02.002
[62] Ibid.
[63] Johnathan Clough
(above n 60) 309.
[64] Nnenna
Ifeanyi-Ajufo (above n 57).
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Johnathan Clough
(above n 66)
[68] Rita Shackel
(above n 47).
[69] Graeme Horsman
(above n 64).
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Johnathan Clough
(above n 70) 326.
[73] Crown Prosecution
Service (above n 59).
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Giorgia
Macilotti, ‘Online Child Pornography: Conceptual Issues and Law Enforcement
Challenges’ (2020) in Augusto Balloni and Raffaella Sette, Trends and Issues in Crime Prevention, Rehabilitation and Victim
Support (IGI Global, 1st ed, 2020).
[77] Lesli C.Esposito
(above n 56) 543.
[78] Ibid, 545.
[79] Ibid, 545.
[80] Yulia Razmetaeva
et al, ‘Jurisdictional issues in the digital age’ (2021) 10(1) Ius Humani,
Revista de Derecho 176.
[81] Sexual Offences
Act 2003 (UK), s 72.
[82] Johnathan Clough
(above n 75) 329.
[83] Crown Prosecution
Service (above n 78).
[84] Rita Shackel
(above n 71) 170.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Lesli C.Esposito
(above n 82) 559.
[88] Ma Xinmin, ‘Key
Issues and Future Development of International Cyberspace’ (2016) 2(1) China
Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 125, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740016500068
cited in Yulia Razmetaeva et al (above n 83) 178.
[89] Lesli C.Esposito
(above n 90).
[90] Ibid, 562.
[91] Yulia Razmetaeva
et al (above n 91).
[92] Rita Shackel
(above n 89) 154.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Ibid, 176.
[95] Yulia Razmetaeva
et al (above n 94) 178.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Lesli C.Esposito
(above n 93) 565.
[98] Yulia Razmetaeva et al (above n 99) 177.
[99] Rita Shackel (above n 99)
[100] Loren Jolly, ‘Towards an alternative to territorial
jurisdiction to face criminality committed through or facilitated by the use of
blockchains’ 123, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10993/39217
[101] Rita Shackel (above n 106)
[102] Nnenna Ifeanyi-Ajufo (above n 69) 65.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.